By Matthew Mainen
March 15, 2011
As the US pursues multilateralism for the Libya situation, it has looked to Saudi Arabia for support. For decades, the US has maintained a tacit policy of disregarding Saudi Arabia’s dismal human rights record in exchange for cooperation on pressing strategic matters and oil interests. Business as usual, however, will embolden the monarchy to aggressively quell dissent at a time when unprecedented momentum catapults Arab progressives.
President Obama’s desire for a multilateral approach is understandable. The unilateralism of the Bush Doctrine left the US critically overburdened in Iraq and internationally resented.
Going at it alone in Libya is out of the question, and fortunately unnecessary.
America’s European allies are not only on the same page as the US, but they may be a paragraph ahead. Unseen during the Bush years, Europe, and not the United States, is leading the public campaign against an Arab despot.
While the US cautiously crafted its approach, the UK’s David Cameron became the first Western leader to embrace aggression action against Gadaffi. Now, France has recognized the rebel’s transitional council as the legitimate representative of the Libyan people.
Saudi Arabia and its neighboring monarchies understand that Libya has crossed the international community’s line in the Sahara, and action, even if covert, is inevitable. As a result, the Gulf Cooperation Council has joined the call for a no-fly zone.
Such support, however, is not free. Saudi Arabia sees Libya as the sacrificial lamb that will shield it from US pressure when it responds to inevitable protests.
Saudi Arabia has watched protests engulf neighbor by neighbor. It could discount those in Yemen due to pronounced cultural and institutional differences. But then they spread to Bahrain and now Oman. Moderate protests are now emerging in Saudi Arabia.
When the US intervened on the part of Bahrain’s protestors and demanded that King Khalifa refrain from violence, it set a standard for its response to future Gulf protests. Heavy-handedness will not be tolerated by the only state standing between the Arab Gulf and Iran.
The US, however, has shown a willingness to backtrack and throw Saudi reformists to the wolves in exchange for cooperation on Libya. Wanting as little direct involvement as possible, the Obama Administration has asked Saudi Arabia to arm the Libyan rebels.
Saudi Arabia’s price for such actions has remained constant for decades: the US must remain steadfast in its support for the monarchy internationally, and more importantly, against any domestic opposition. The al-Saud family must be allowed to handle its domestic affairs as it sees fit.
The policy of support and non-interference has been the US’ quid for the successive Saudi quos of preserving American oil interests, then containing communism, and finally a full partnership in strategic affairs.
This strategic US-Saudi partnership was born in the wake of the cooperative effort to aid the mujahedeen in repelling the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. It persisted through the Iran-Contra affair, and was solidified during the first Gulf War.
But the times are changing.
The ongoing pan-Arab protests have the potential to usher in a new era in the Mideast, and at such times a state must recognize that certain aspects of strategic partnerships may no longer be beneficial.
This couldn’t be truer when it comes the US’ considering an anachronistic reliance on Saudi Arabia. There is no need for the US to utilize a dubious proxy when the vast international opposition to the Gadaffi regime renders Saudi involvement unnecessary.
After all, other countries, such as the United Kingdom have publically discussed arming the rebels themselves. If they were to follow through, it would be covert and shield the US from public perception of meddling.
The US’ dependence on Saudi oil is balanced by Saudi Arabia’s greater dependence on the US in containing Iran. Consequently, avoiding scenarios in which the US owes the monarchy a favor removes any leverage the Saudis could use in resisting the same pressure that has been applied on Bahrain. The US can send the Saudis the right message by not partnering with them against Libya.
Matthew Mainen is a policy analyst at the Institute for Gulf Affairs
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