6/7/11
By Joshua Jacobs
As observers wait to see if the second ceasefire in less than a week will hold in Yemen it has become clear that President Saleh, who is now being treated for his injuries in Saudi Arabia, and his allies are in a much weaker position than they have been in at anytime during the crisis. On May 23 in the first round of fighting, forces loyal to Sheik Sadiq al-Ahmar, head of the Hashid tribal confederation, clashed with security forces all over the capital and its environs. Government forces proved surprisingly ineffective at combating the Hashid forces and lost control of several ministry buildings; with reports at one point stating that the heavily fortified interior ministry had fallen to the tribal fighters. Though the last report later proved to be untrue, it highlighted the fluid nature of the fighting and the relative inability of Saleh’s forces to contain the fighting. The ceasefire signed on May 27 lasted only a few days before breaking down as renewed fighting hit the streets. Reinforced by tribal fighters infiltrating the city, Ahmar’s forces challenged Saleh’s troops for control of the capital and seized large segments of Sana’a.
Throughout this fighting a significant unknown variable was Major General Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar (no relationship to Sadiq or Hamid al-Ahmar). General Mohsen had defected to the side of the protesters early in the demonstrations but he had made no move to deploy the nearly 50,000 troops under his command. It remained uncertain how many troops he could rally should he choose to engage Saleh directly. While there have been reports that troops loyal to General Mohsen were arming and training protesters and tribesmen, he spent most of the crisis on the sidelines avoiding direct involvement. Much of that changed on June 1 when Saleh’s forces launched an attack on one of the brigade headquarters of General Mohsen, reportedly seeking to contain an imminent defection from one of Mohsen’s brigadiers. Instead the attack brought the General and his forces into the fight for the first time and they proceeded to provide artillery and armored support to Sheik Ahamar’s fighters, allowing them to make greater gains in the city. The seized Saleh’s General People’s Congress (GPC) headquarters and made inroads in the suburbs. In the two days preceding this latest ceasefire thousands of Hashid tribal fighters were streaming towards the city, pressing against the military cordon set around the capital. Though the fighters were evidently unable to break through the governments lines, heavy fighting still consumed the suburbs and more ground held by Saleh was lost.
It was in this deteriorating atmosphere that the most recent round of fighting reached its climax. On June 3 the presidential compound was struck by a rocket barrage which wounded President Saleh and several high ranking government officials. The rebel tribesmen as well as General Mohsen denied responsibility for the attack. Instead they placed the blame on President Saleh, accusing him of orchestrating the attack as a way to build a narrative of victimhood. Whether or not this is true, (and it seems unlikely that Saleh would be capable of orchestrating a rocket attack on his own compound precisely enough to ensure he was only wounded), it demonstrated the manifest weakness of Saleh’s position. Even if the accusation were true, the fact that Saleh would feel it necessary to concoct this scene as a way to bolster domestic and regional support would be a sad statement on his political position. On the other hand the likely reality that some faction had the ability and willingness to open fire on the compound drastically undermined the perception of security for the regime.
It makes sense then that Saleh would use the attack on the compound as an excuse to exit the country. He left aboard a Saudi medical plane under the pretext of seeking medical treatment for his wounds in Riyadh. However, many accounts claimed his wounds were minor and he was able to walk off the plane in Riyadh prompting concerns of a possible imminent return. In recent days claims have surfaced that his wounds are far more severe than previously thought, with reports claiming that he has severe burns and is in critical condition. Local media observers have also cast doubt on the veracity of an audio tape that had been released claiming that it was not the President, or that it sounded like a severely weakened Saleh. Suspicion abounds and uncertainty remains as to his actual disposition. There is the possibility that Saleh is trying to shield the full scope of his injuries to keep the opposition guessing and give breathing room to his family. It is also possible that this is a cover to shield what will be a permanent exit from Yemen, perhaps in an arrangement concocted with Saudi assistance.
Whether or not his departure proves to be temporary it has already significantly altered the countries political dynamic. Without Saleh, the Yemeni constitution mandated that power would transfer to the Vice President Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi of Saleh’s GPC party. On June 4 he was formally invested with the power of the presidency and become acting president. On June 5 the US Ambassador met with acting President Hadi in what was apparently a productive meeting. The meeting was noteworthy as it was a gesture that had not been extended to President Saleh for some time.
Yet the transfer of power may not be what it appears. Saleh has spent decades building up nepotistic control over the organs of state and security in Yemen. His son Ahmed controls the Republican Guard, his half brother Mohammed commands the Air force, his nephew Mohammed Abdullah controls the National Security Organization, and two of his brother in laws Ahmed Abdullah and Ahmed al-Kuhlani are the Governors of Taiz and Aden respectively. These are only a few of the more major positions held by Saleh family members, but they serve to illustrate the tight hold his family and by extension Saleh have on the political and military structure of Yemen. So while acting President Hadi may be the ostensible leader of the government, it remains to be seen whether he or his allies in the GPC can actually wield any independent political power. This will soon prove to be very important as the Saudi-negotiated ceasefire allegedly has the support of all the major factions involved, including Sheik Ahmar, General Mohsen, and acting President Hadi. If there is a return to negotiations as many hope, then Saleh and his family may still retain the capacity to veto a decision with military force and pull Yemen back down into a vicious power struggle.
The ceasefire agreement highlights the intricate involvement the Saudi Kingdom has had in the current crisis in Yemen. The current truce was negotiated at the behest of King Abdullah and indicates the reach of Saudi agents and their influence is but the latest in a long history of Saudi involvement in the country. On his death bed King Abdullah bin Abdul Aziz cautioned his sons against allowing the much more populous Yemen to grow too strong and threaten the nascent Saudi Kingdom. As the 20th century wore on and Saudi Arabia grew richer and more secure the fear of Yemenis domination receded. Instead Saudi Arabia was forced to contemplate the security and stability of its much more divisive and politically fragile neighbor. This manifested in the battle between Saudi Arabia and Gamel Abdul Nasser’s Egyptian Arab Republic over the fate of Yemen. The battle began in 1962 when a socialist republican government was established in Sana’a after a coup d’etat. The new government was almost immediately engaged in a brutal struggle for power with the aggrieved royalist Zaydi Shia Imamate primarily based in Northern Yemen bordering Saudi Arabia. Nasser, who saw the opportunity to expand the influence of Arab republicanism and challenge the Saudi monarchy, decided to provide support to the republicans. King Faisal saw the threat in allowing a Nasserist republican foothold to develop on Arabian peninsula and threaten Saudi Arabia. The King authorized the disbursement of tens of millions in military aid and enlisted Western military advisers to prop up the royalist opposition. For the next decade Egyptian and Yemeni republican troops battled the royalists for control of the country. It was only with intense Saudi financial and military support that royalists managed to stay in the fight. Though the Saudis critically weakened Egypt and Nasser in the fight for Yemen they were unable to push the royalists to an outright victory. After one final attempt to take Sana’a failed the Saudi’s withdrew their support and signed an accord with Egypt. After a decade of frenzied combat that had claimed the lives of tens of thousands the Yemen Arab Republic was unified and recognized by Saudi Arabia in 1970.
Though the Saudis had failed to achieve their political objective in the war, they had cultivated important and long lasting connections amongst Yemen’s all important tribal confederations; especially amongst the Hashid. Saudi Arabia has routinely used these networks to dispense patronage, stipends, pensions, and other allowances to retain the loyalty of key tribal leaders. This has made Saudi Arabia incredibly important to the political fabric of Yemen. It was in large part due to Saudi efforts that major leaders of the Hashid and Baqil tribal confederations continued to support Saleh even during the 1994 Civil War at a time when Sheik Ahmar and his brothers disagreed with their father and wavered in their support for Saleh. Some of the key leaders of the opposition in the current crisis such as Sheik Ahmar, Hamad al-Ahmar, and General Mohsen, as well as many of their lieutenants, have close ties to Saudi Arabia on a familial and political level. These ties have granted Saudi Arabia an important say in not only who comes to power in Yemen but also in what policies are carried out as evidenced by the numerous consultations Ali Abdullah Saleh held with Riyadh during his reign.
The reaction of Saudi Arabia to the uprisings in Egypt, Bahrain, and Syria has been uniformly negative, with the Kingdom taking a strong pro-regime stance. In the case of Bahrain the Kingdom actually sent troops in to enforce its counter-revolution. It may seem surprising then that the Saudis would take such a different tack on their large and critically important neighbor to the south. The answer lies in the fact that Saudi Arabia has much more at stake in Yemen than the ideological outcome, especially if it becomes a victim of civil war. Saudi Arabia has numerous security and political concerns in Yemen. From 2009-2010 fighting broke out between the Houthi rebels and the Saudi military. The fighting quickly spiraled out of control as Houthi fighters took positions within Saudi territory, forcing a bloody border war which eventually led to Saudi troops being bogged down difficult fighting. While the fighting was relatively minor it still resulted in tens of thousands of internally displaced persons (IDPs). The Kingdom proved dangerously inept at handling the refugees even in small quantities with King Abdullah eventually having to order the construction of thousands of housing projects as a solution. If the country were to break down into real civil war Saudi Arabia, which already has the allure of being a hyper-wealthy state with vast employment opportunities, would have to contend with potentially millions of refugees and no ready method of dealing with the problem.
The Saudis have also accused Iran of providing weapons and other material support to the Houthi insurgents that Saudi Arabia and Yemen have been battling. Though there is no evidence of Iranian support to the Houthis beyond general endorsements and low level contacts, Saudi Arabia stuck to this line partially in an attempt to rally Western support and partially as a result of the paranoid fears in the House of Saud of Iranian penetration of the Arabian Peninsula. In the wake of Bahrain crisis Iran has found it’s diplomatic efforts melting away in the Gulf. Handed with a new persona non grata status by the Gulf States Iran in a self fulfilling prophecy could choose to interpret the changing dynamic in the region and the descent of Yemen into chaos as a signal to finally get involved and begin arming the Houthis in a manner similar to Hezbollah. This would trigger a crisis-level response from Saudi Arabia and would require a massive intervention to contain.
The border skirmishes highlighted the importance for Riyadh of having a stable regime in Sana’a. Though the Saudis worked closely with Saleh in the fight against the Houthis and periodically against Al-Qaeda, they place a premium on stability. Early on in the crisis the Saudis made the calculation that Saleh had lost the support of not only the public but the key players in Yemen. This meant that he would likely be unable to hold onto power without great bloodshed and disorder and outcome Saudi Arabia wants to avoid at all costs. As a result they endorsed the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) negotiated deal that would have led to Saleh’s speedy resignation in exchange for his immunity and shelter as a way to try and leverage him from power easily and assure a stable transition.. For weeks Saleh strung the GCC along, accepting and then rejecting the deal, severely straining his relationships in the region and antagonizing the opposition at home. At this point Saudi Arabia likely stepped up its support for its allies in Yemen. It seems inconceivable that Hamid al-Ahmar or his brother Sheik Sadiq al-Ahmar could have begun their uprising against Saleh without the consent or support of Saudi Arabia in some capacity, due to the enormous amount of patronage that the tribal leaders rely on. Saudi influence over the rebel factions can also be evidenced by the incredible ease with which they have managed to broker ceasefires with the opposition, along with the rebels’ apparent quick acceptance of acting President Hadi.
As it stands right now the Saudis appear to be in a very strong position, stronger than they could have reasonably hoped for at the outset of the crisis. First and foremost, they have the object of their frustration Ali Abdullah Saleh in their hands, convalescing at a hospital in Riyadh. Thanks to the role they played in his departure and their role in the ceasefires they have won accolades as a peacemaker and responsible power in Yemen. The Saudis also retain the support of most of the Hashid tribal leaders and are believed to have good relations with acting President Hadi. This gives them an excellent chance of coming out of this crisis with an ally at the head of the Yemeni government. Furthermore, their ability to act as a potential kingmaker could win over some reticent members of the Saleh family who desire power or a significant role in a new government and might seek to woo the Kingdom in spite of their father’s apparent exile.
While the ceasefire may hold for the moment and negotiations might resume, everything depends on what happens to Saleh and his family. There remains great uncertainty as to whether Saleh will return to Yemen. The conventional wisdom of the day says that he will not return and certainly it is not in the Saudis best interest to let him return. Yet if he loudly wishes to return, it may prove untenable to keep him trapped in the Kingdom. If he does return to Yemen it is almost certain that the country would spiral back into violence. However even if he does not return to the country his family and allies still have the ability to wreak havoc and are a strong faction that must be reconciled. Saleh’s sons and brothers as previously mentioned control the Republican Guard, the Air Force, the special forces, and more and thus retain a great deal of power. They have the capacity to potentially veto any agreement made with the opposition, or return to the fight for the sake of gaining power in their own right. In particular Ahmed al-Saleh, who controls the Republican Guard, is a figure to keep a close eye on.
The Saudi goal at this juncture is to maintain a lid on the current crisis, effect a smooth transition to a new head of state, and prevent a power vacuum that could lead to a regionally catastrophic civil war. At the same time they probably hope to exploit their current advantages by trying to confirm a candidate of their choosing in Yemen. Right now they seem content with acting President Hadi, but this is just the beginning and there is much political wrangling ahead.
The other obvious major player has been the United States, and yet the role of the US has been by all accounts minimal. The US has had a relatively close relationship with Saleh as a result of the partnership that was forged to battle Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). The bulk of this relationship manifested itself in Saleh allowing drone strikes to take place on his territory, and with the US giving military aid and professional training. However, the aid has been criticized as many observers say, not incorrectly, that Saleh has been focusing on the Houthis and on building up his internal security forces rather than fighting Al-Qaeda. With no apparent alternative and with the perception that AQAP and its head Anwar al-Awlaki were amongst the greatest terror threats facing the US, the aid and relationship continued. When the current crisis boiled over the US response was slow as it was in Egypt, and when it finally came it was timid. Other than saying that the US opposed the use of violence on demonstrators, no clear US position was articulated. As the violence and protests accelerated, the US continued to avoid taking a strong position of its own. Instead the US slowly warmed to the GCC intervention and eventually endorsed their efforts to push Saleh to resign. It was only after Saleh toyed with the deal for several weeks and then refused to sign it, that the US took a firmer stance with Secretary Clinton demanding that he accede to the deal and peacefully stand aside.
Despite the change in rhetoric coming from the White House the US position on Yemen has remained ambiguous. This is partially because there appears to be a dearth of options available. Saleh was a rock of stability in Yemen and with him gone there are no easy US allies that can be picked out from the chaos. There is no strong relationship between Washington and any of the opposition leaders though it is pointedly not exceptionally negative either. While others remain concerned that in the absence of a strong central authority Al-Qaeda and their Islamist affiliate groups will take advantage of the power vacuum. This fear was compounded by the apparent fall of Zinjibar, the capital of the Abyan province, to Islamist and possibly Al-Qaeda fighters. Though accusations immediately flew that Saleh had orchestrated the fall of the city in an attempt to appeal to the West, it nevertheless highlights the legitimate fears and security concerns the US has in Yemen. It appears that with the succession of Vice President Hadi to the acting presidency the US may have a partner to engage with, as evidenced by the meeting Hadi had with US envoys. So far the US has taken a backseat to Saudi and GCC led efforts in Yemen, since the end goal of stability and security is a shared one. There is also the prospect of democracy sprouting in Yemen, and this prospect may draw the US to take a closer look at leaders like Sheik Sadiq al-Ahmar, who doubles as the head of the Hashid and a critical leader of the al-Islah opposition party as a potential future partner.
While much has happened over the past week, it would be premature and a mistake to call the crisis over, as some in the media and as many protesters in Sana’a have done. Even though Saleh is gone and it appears as though his departure will be permanent, it is not yet a certainty. Nor is it certain that the violence has come to a real end, and the power struggle has certainly not come to a conclusion. There is too much that has yet to be determined in Yemen, and the coming weeks will be critical if the country is to avert a civil war. It is imperative that US policy makers not lose sight of this important fact, a civil war in Yemen has dramatic implications for the wider region and for US national security. The creation of a cohesive policy in Yemen is incredibly important especially if the US wants to engage with Riyadh and have a say in the future of the country. The time for action and engagement must come now while the situation is in flux and fluidity is the name of the game. The window will not hold open long, and there is no telling what things will look like when the dust settles.
Joshua Jacobs is a policy analyst at the Institute for Gulf Affairs.
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