Competition between Turkey, Iran, and Saudi

By Lev Yuriditsky

For anyone following the developments in the Middle East, it is apparent that Turkey, Iran, and Saudi Arabia are circling the countries of the Arab Spring like vultures over a dying cattle. The changing domestic make-up of the countries in the forefront of the Arab Spring is forcing the strongest players of the Middle East to reevaluate their foreign policies in order to secure themselves a prominent position in the region.

While Iran and Saudi Arabia are actively trying to spread their influence in the Arab world and are certainly taking measures to position themselves as the regional power, neither country has had to make such drastic changes in their foreign policy as Turkey has.

Turkey, with its geographical position as the bridge between Europe, the Middle East, and Asia, has literally and figuratively been straddling between the civilizations since the Ottoman Empire, which stretched from central Europe to the Middle East, western Asia, and all throughout Northern Africa. Although Turkey is now a fraction of the size of the Ottoman Empire, it still maintains the same bridging role and as such, its foreign policy works as a scale which when beneficial tips towards Europe and the West, and at other times the weight is heavier on the side of the Middle East.

To position itself as a leader in the newly-emerging Arab world, Turkey’s first step was to distance itself from its strong ally and close neighbor, Israel. Turkey, which has for a long time benefited from a strong economic, political, and strategic alliance with Israel, decided that it was best to distance itself from the country, whose close relationship with Turkey has over the years drawn mass criticism from the Muslim world. Recently, Turkey has sent home Israeli diplomats, including the ambassador to Turkey, over the year-long conflict as a result of Israel killing 9 Turkish nationals on a Gaza-bound flotilla aimed at breaking the naval blockade of Gaza. In a more extreme act of hostility, Turkey warned that in any future flotilla, Turkey will protect its ship with its own naval forces. This, of course, is simply harsh rhetoric aimed at boosting Turkey’s Arab-street credibility, as last month Turkey also urged its citizens not to participate in a flotilla. Turkey went on to freeze the joint military drills they have practiced with Israel for decades, however on the same day they agreed to allow the deployment of a radar on its land as part of NATO’s missile defense system. Turkey also declared that it will not allow Israel to drill for oil in the Mediterranean.  However, within days, Turkey took steps back from such declarations.

Turkey’s rhetoric on Israel has begun to sound much like Iran’s, another non-Arab power in the Middle East. After establishing his Arab-street credibility and earning more fans in the Arab world along with silencing many of his critics, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan set out on a diplomatic tour through the Middle East with stops in Egypt, Tunisia and Libya as well as the West Bank. He told the crowds in each country exactly what they wanted to hear. In the West Bank, he assured Palestinian leader, Mahmoud Abbas that he will do everything he can to support the upcoming Palestinian Statehood bid in the U.N.

In Egypt, thousands cheered him after he landed at Cairo airport. Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood were also there to show support, even though they were upset by his calls for a secular regime when he declared that “In a secular regime, people are free to be religious or not… I recommend a secular constitution for Egypt. Do not fear secularism, because it does not mean being an enemy of religion.”
In Libya, Erdogan was greeted by Mustafa Abdel Jalil, chairman of the National Transitional Council, and promised that Turkey would aid Libya militarily and politically, and offered help in the construction a parliament.

While he has not visited Syria, he has made great efforts to distance himself from former ally, president Bashar al-Assad and to support the protesters in Syria. Erdogan realizes that when al-Assad’s regime, backed by the Alawite minority of Syria, falls – it will be only natural for the Sunni-majority country, bordering Turkey in the south to welcome an influential Turkey. This is much to the dismay of long-time Syrian ally and Shia brethren-nation, Iran, who will most likely lose influence in Syria.
Turkey seems to be in the best position to be the regional power in the Middle East. Unlike Iran, Turkey is not an enemy of the West, and is actually a NATO member. Due to their current situations, Egypt, Tunisia, and Libya cannot afford to alienate the West in favor of stronger relations with Iran – it will only stunt their development. Iran likely realizes this and is why the Ahmedinejad, as a “unilateral humanitarian gesture” is negotiating with the judiciary powers of the Islamic Republic for the release of two American hikers who have been sentenced to 8 years in prison on flimsy charges of espionage. In addition to this gesture, Iran has again agreed to renew negotiations on its controversial nuclear program.

Turkey is able to draw respect from the Muslim world due to its prospering economy (currently 15th largest in the world), influence in the world, Muslim and Western, military strength, and freedom enjoyed by its population in comparison to the majority of the Muslim world. What the protesters of the Arab spring have really been calling for this whole time is alive and flourishing in Turkey, not in the isolated and oppressive regime of Iran, a country whose Shia majority population is a minority in the Arab world. Iran is attempting to evoke a bond between the Arab Spring and the Iranian Revolution of 1979 by painting the upheaval as an “Islamic Awakening” rather than an Arab Spring. However, if Iran wants to be more influential in the new governments of the Arab world, Ahmedinejad needs to quickly show signs of liberalization and warming of ties with the West, an unlikely occurrence especially after many years of hostile threats against key U.S. ally, Israel.

Saudi Arabia is also in a position to spread its influence, but still not likely to compete with Turkey for regional dominance. While Saudi Arabia, loosely speaking, does share the same faith as the majority of the Arab world, as well as the same language, which cannot be said about Turkey, the Saudi version of Sunni Islam is viewed even by the devout Muslims of the region as far too rigid. In the Arab world, the lavish lifestyles of the Saudi royal family are constantly criticized for its contrast from the country’s Islamic identity. The newly-formed governments of the region will not be quick to welcome the influence of such an extremely Islamic and oppressive regime as the Saudi one.

Saudi Arabia is however an enormously wealthy country and has been experiencing increased cooperation with Turkey. Both economies are booming and have a lot of opportunity to benefit from one another in many sectors. Turkey recently experienced a cooling of ties with Saudi Arabia after Turkey supported Iran’s nuclear developments, but then again a warming when the Sunni majority country of Turkey suspected Iran of fueling Shiite-led protests in Bahrain against the Sunni government. Turkey also warmed relations with Saudi Arabia when it again distanced itself from Iran by supporting the Syrian people revolting against President al-Assad.

Saudi Arabia is also making changes in its foreign policy in favor of gaining support in the Arab world. Much like Turkey, Saudi Arabia is supporting the Palestinian attempt at Statehood against the U.S. vetoing this move. Prince Turki al Faisal of the Saudi royal family has warned that the U.S. vetoing UN recognition of Palestinian statehood, Saudi Arabia will have to abandon its position as the USA’s key foreign policy tool among the Arab countries. He is quoted as saying: “…Saudi Arabia would pursue other policies at odds with those of the United States, including opposing the government of Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki in Iraq and refusing to open an embassy there despite American pressure to do so. The Saudi government might part ways with Washington in Afghanistan and Yemen as well.”

In conclusion, Iran lacks the political clout in the international arena needed to be a beneficial partner for the new Arab countries. It is too isolated, not part of the WTO like Saudi Arabia and Turkey does not share the same version of Islam as the Arab countries and is also not viewed so favorably by the Arab people. Saudi Arabia may share the language and the same branch of Islam as the Arab world, its version of Sunni Islam is too extreme as are the leaders who choose to not follow it, while forcing it on the rest of the society. Saudi Arabia is much more of a Western ally than Iran and it has a lot of financial clout, but certainly not compared to Turkey and is not nearly as favored in the West as Turkey (so long as Turkey doesn’t cross the line its anti-Israel rhetoric). The best bet for the Saudis is to continue cooperating with Turkey so as not to be pushed to the side by them, but rather gain from Turkey’s growing influence.

Turkey, on the other hand, has an incredibly strong and prospering economy, strong influence in the world, the same faith as the Arab countries in question, and a much freer society where people can choose Islam or secularism. And now, with the freezing of relations with Israel, Ankara has dropped its main source of criticism from the Arab world. As a bridge between the West and the Middle East, Turkey has the best chance to bring about great changes in the region.

Lev Yuriditsky is adjunct policy analyst at the Institute for Gulf Affairs.